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REGULATING HOME EQUITY PROTECTION COMPANIES AND 
CONTRACTS: ARE STATES MAKING “THE BEST” AN ENEMY OF 
“THE GOOD?” 
 
JOHN E. MARTHINSEN* 
*** 
Residential homes are the largest, most leveraged assets in most U.S. 
families’ portfolios. Home equity protection (HEP) contracts offer 
opportunities to safeguard these real estate interests. In the United States, 
each state decides if a HEP contract is financial guarantee insurance (FGI) 
and, therefore, regulated by the state laws and insurance commission rules, 
or non-insurance financial protection (NIFP), which may escape state and 
federal regulations. Because HEP contracts have the potential to provide 
substantial benefits to homeowners, their regulation should be designed to 
protect state residents and encourage the development of safe alternatives. 
This article explains HEP contracts, their development, and why states 
should treat those that require material interests as FGI. Particular focus is 
put on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of HEP contracts that are 
linked to home price indices, (2) why linking these contracts to price indices 
should not disqualify them as FGI, and (3) how HEP companies engage in 
regulatory arbitrage by linking their policies to home price indices and 
claiming NIFP status. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1945, U.S. household equity in real estate has grown more 
than 12,600%, reaching approximately $12.4 trillion at the end of the third 
quarter 2015.1 Despite the fact that individuals may face a greater likelihood 
of their houses falling in value than suffering damage from fire, wind, hail, 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Economics and International Business and The Distinguished 
Chair in Swiss Economics at Babson College.  
1 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Households: 
Owners Equity in Real Estate, Level, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ 
OEHRENWBSHNO (accessed January 1, 2016).   
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lightning, theft, or vandalism, the U.S. financial and insurance markets have 
developed few practical ways for families to protect themselves against 
declining real estate prices.2 Furthermore, where and when alternatives have 
been offered, turnover has been rather weak – even when policies were 
subsidized.  
As their name implies, home equity protection (HEP) contracts 
safeguard the non-debt value (i.e., equity) of residential homes, but their 
particular forms can vary considerably. They could be written to safeguard 
only homeowners’ initial down payments, but coverage could also be 
broadened to include home improvements, mortgage amortization, and cost-
of-living adjustments. HEP contracts could be offered only on primary 
residences or made available for second, third, or investment homes. 
Maturities could be long-term (e.g., 10-to-15 years), short-term, with the 
expectation of rollovers every two-to-three years, or last as long as the 
policyholder owns a protected home. Premiums might be up-front, lump-
sum payments or monthly installments. When a protected home is sold, these 
contracts could be assumable – or not. Contracts might restrict claims to 
individuals who sell their homes at a loss and move certain distances away, 
but they could just as easily allow claims at contract maturity or remove all 
limitations so that claims can be made any time the contract is in-force. 
Insurance is an elusive term, which explains why it is defined in 
different ways by different states. In general, it (1) is a contract, (2) with 
consideration secured by premiums that (3) pays or indemnifies the contract 
owner for (4) fortuitous3 events that (5) cause financial loss. If a HEP 
contract is classified as financial guaranty insurance (FGI), then it is 
regulated by state laws and insurance commission regulations. By contrast, 
if the contract is classified by a state as non-insurance financial protection 
(NIFP), then it escapes that particular state’s regulations and possibly federal 
regulations, as well.  
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
defines FGI as a contract that protects a policyholder from “changes in the 
value of specific assets or commodities, financial or commodity indices, or 
                                                                                                                 
2 Robert J. Shiller & Allan N. Weiss, Home Equity Insurance, 19(1) J. REAL 
ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 21 (1999). 
3 In this context, fortuitous means that claims and the events that trigger them 
are independent and identically distributed (i.e., random), which implies they cannot 
be accurately forecasted. 
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price levels in general.” 4 Despite this guidance, each state can determine 
whether a HEP company is engaged in the business of insurance and, 
therefore, should be regulated as an FGI company.  
In the past, FGI contracts focused mainly on protecting investors 
from credit risks associated with interest-earning public securities, such as 
municipal debt obligations, and private debt obligations, such as commercial 
mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, automobile 
loans, and student loans. Since the 1980s, many states have required FGI 
companies to follow monoline rules, which have forced them to separate this 
business from other insurance lines. Such partitioning was intended to isolate 
FGI risks from other insurance lines so that contagion into or out of this 
sector did not occur.  
This article explains HEP contracts, their development, and why 
states should treat those that require material interests as FGI. Particular 
focus is put on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of HEP contracts that 
are linked to home price indices, such as the S&P/Case-Schiller Index, 
Federal Housing Finance Administration's Index, and CoreLogic Index, (2) 
why linking these contracts to price indices should not disqualify them as 
FGI, and (3) how HEP companies engage in regulatory arbitrage by linking 
their policies to home price indices and claiming NIFP status.  
 
II. WHAT ARE HEP CONTRACTS? 
 
HEP contracts offer policyholders practical ways to safeguard the 
equity investments in their homes. If done correctly, these contracts can 
improve capital market efficiency, lower borrowing costs, and provide 
capital market access to borrowers with relatively low credit ratings. They 
can also provide social benefits, such as increasing labor mobility (e.g., 
accepting jobs that require relocation and the sale of homes at losses).5 On 
the negative side, HEP contracts may encourage individuals to increase debt 
levels to unsustainable levels; discourage routine home maintenance 
                                                                                                                 
4 See Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’r, Definition of Insurance: Definition of Insurance 
Working Group (Sept. 12, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.naic.org/ 
store/free/DOI-OP.pdf; see also, NAIC Financial Guaranty Insurance Guideline:      
§ 1A (1) (e), http://www.naic.org/store/free/GDL-1626.pdf (accessed January 1, 
2016) (emphasis added). 
5 See Yulia Demyanyk, Dmytro Hryshko, María José Luengo-Prado, & Bent 
Sorensen, Keeping the House or Moving for a Job, 9 FED. RES. BANK OF 
CLEVELAND. ECON. COMMENTARY 1 (2013) (explaining doubts about this benefit).  
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improvements, and repairs; and induce premature home sales in declining 
markets, thereby accelerating systemic reductions in real estate prices. 
Normally, HEP contracts have one-time costs (e.g., between 1.5% 
and 3.0% of a home’s protected value),6 long-term maturities (e.g., 10 to 15 
years, but they terminate when a home is sold), relatively short vesting 
periods (e.g., 2 years), and maximum limits on claim payments (e.g., 25% of 
the protected value). Other limitations often apply, such as deductibles and 
denial of claims on foreclosed homes.  
The vesting period has two major functions. First, it discourages 
short-term, speculative gains by flipping homes (i.e., purchasing houses with 
no intention to occupy, making minor improvements, and then quickly trying 
to resell them at higher prices). Second, by delaying claim payments, vesting 
reduces the ability to forecast changes in real estate prices, which (perhaps, 
ironically) improves the ability to price option contracts. 
 
A. AN EXAMPLE OF HOW HEP CONTRACTS WORK 
 
Consider a family that purchases a home for $100,000, with a 
$90,000 mortgage loan and $10,000 down payment. To protect its equity 
investment, the family purchases a HEP contract having a two-year vesting 
period, 10-year maturity, and maximum payout of 25%. Exhibit 1 shows the 
consequences if the home is sold after its value rises by 10%, stays the same, 
or falls by 10%, 30%, and 40%. Notice that, during the two-year vesting 
period, the contract pays no claims, regardless of the percentage decline in 
the home’s sales price. Afterwards, a ceiling of $25,000 is imposed on claims 
when the home’s selling price falls by 25% or more. Therefore, if the price 
falls to $70,000, the payout cap is surpassed and claims remain at $25,000. 
Similarly, a claim floor equal to $0 occurs when the home’s price stays the 
same or rises. In between these limits, claim payments are linearly and 
inversely related to the protected home’s current market value. Therefore, at 
market prices of $90,000 and $80,000, these policies pay $10,000 and 
$20,000, respectively. As Exhibit 1 shows, the wealth of a HEP contract 
owner can rise, stay the same, fall, and even become negative, depending on 
the direction and extent of home price movements. This point will be 
important, later, in our discussion of indemnification. 
                                                                                                                 
6 Premium differences may be based on geographical location and individual 
considerations. 
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B. BRIEF HISTORY OF HEP CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
 The first U.S. experiment with HEP contracts was a Department of 
Defense program for military personnel in the mid-1960s, followed by a 
municipally sponsored program in Oak Park, Illinois during the mid-to-
late1970s. Thereafter, in 2002, Yale University’s International Center for 
Finance collaborated with the Syracuse Neighborhood Initiative in Syracuse 
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N.Y. to create a non-profit HEP program, called Home HeadQuarters.7 Its 
purpose was to reinvigorate home ownership in depressed Syracuse 
neighborhoods. For the Oak Park experiment, claims were based on 
transaction prices (i.e., purchase and sale prices), while claims for the 
Syracuse experiment were based on changes in a price index. In 2011, Ohio-
based EquityLock Solutions Inc. began offering HEP contracts that also 
linked claims to changes in local price indices.  
Until relatively recently, U.S. housing busts were mainly regional, 
but the Great Recession (2007 – 2009) changed that, causing many to believe 
that this severe and prolonged compression of real estate prices might pave 
the way for tandem increases in the supply of and demand for innovative 
HEP contracts. Greater demand was expected from: (1) homeowners, 
seeking to safeguard the real estate values of their portfolios, (2) mortgage 
lenders, seeking protection from worrisome loan-to-value ratios, (3) 
investors, seeking synthetic real estate returns via futures and credit 
instruments, (4) developers, seeking protection from declining real estate 
values for projects under construction, (5) insurers, seeking hedges against 
mortgage defaults, and (6) realtors, real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, 
and home sellers, seeking ways to safeguard potential home buyers from 
further real estate price erosion.  
On the other side of the HEP market, greater contract supply was 
expected from professional investors, seeking to increase their real estate 
exposures via financial products, instead of investing in physical properties. 
As well, insurance companies were expected to create new HEP products to 
meet the needs of homeowners, whose equity stakes were ravaged by the 
Great Recession.  
Despite this initial optimism, the U.S. market for HEP contracts has 
been relatively weak. New alternatives have been slow in developing, and 
liquidity in existing markets has been shallow.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
7 This contract had a 30-year maturity and one-time, up-front premium equal to 
about 1.5% of the protected value. Its creators felt that charging annual fees would 
encourage customers to drop this insurance if their home prices increased, thereby 
leaving the policyholder pool with only high-risk families. The loss of customers in 
this way could also decimate the HEP company’s ability to pay claims due to the 
diminishing pool of invested funds. 
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III. WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR WEAK HEP DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY? 
 
HEP markets grow fastest when there are simultaneous increases in 
both the supply of and demand for these contracts. Unfortunately, problems 
on both sides of the market have been evident. 
 
A. REASONS FOR WEAK HEP DEMAND 
 
HEP demand is inversely related to home price expectations.8 It rises 
when expected home prices fall, due to the clear and present danger of wealth 
erosion, and falls when expected home prices rise, causing these fears to 
diminish. As Exhibit 2 shows, during the past 40 years, home prices have 
increased more often than they have decreased.  
 
Exhibit 2 
S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index  
January 1975 to October 2015 
 
                                                                                                                 
8 William N. Goetzmann, Andrew Caplin, Eric Hangen, Barry J. Nalebuff, 
Elisabeth Prentice, John Rodkin, Matthew I. Spiegel, & Tom Skinner, Home Equity 
Insurance: A Pilot Project 4, 9 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12, 
2003). 
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Households: 
Owners Equity in Real Estate, Level, (2014), accessed January 5, 2016, 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CSUSHPINSA/downloaddata. 
 
Lackluster demand for HEP insurance contracts has also been 
caused by sluggish home sales in the particular communities where they have 
been offered. Because these contracts are likely to be purchased at the same 
time as homes, their demand should rise and fall with home sales.9 Therefore, 
factors that reduce the demand for homes also lessen the demand for HEP 
insurance contracts. Among these reasons are recessions, burdensomely high 
real interest rates, high property tax rates, demographic changes, and 
financial disincentives, such as the availability and cost of land, which cause 
residents to move from urban neighborhoods, where HEP experiments have 
been tried, to rural areas. 
The demand for HEP financial products, such as options, forward, 
and futures contracts, has been as weak at the demand for HEP insurance 
products. A major cause of this weakness can be traced to homeowners’ 
concerns about and unfamiliarity with the risk-return tradeoffs of derivative 
markets.  
 
B. REASONS FOR WEAK HEP SUPPLY 
 
HEP contracts are mainly supplied by investors and speculators who 
want to increase their real estate exposures. Insurance companies that are 
willing and able to manage real estate price risks are also potential suppliers. 
Part of the uninspired increase in HEP supply can be attributed to internal 
problems related to suppliers’ strategies and management, but relatively high 
real estate transaction costs, regulations, and perceived risks are also to 
blame. 
 
C. INTERNAL HEP COMPANY PROBLEMS 
 
Managerial ineffectiveness and poorly constructed business plans 
result in over-priced policies, high administrative costs, bureaucratic red tape 
(e.g., causing delays in vetting claims), and contracts excessively loaded with 
                                                                                                                 
9 When a home is purchased, individuals have legal counsel and the advice of 
friends and family, which could be used to make knowledgeable decisions about 
these contracts. Focus groups have confirmed that potential customers feel the most 
important time to purchase a HEP contract is when a home is purchased. See Id. 
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unattractive features, such as high deductibles, long vesting periods, and 
severe restrictions on claims. 
  
D. HIGH REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
Due to the high transactions costs associated with buying and selling 
homes, such as brokerage fees, closing costs, and moving expenses, 
residential real estate markets are highly inefficient relative to their 
counterparts in the commodity, currency, equity, and debt markets.10 
Professional investors are likely to shun exchange-traded and over-the-
counter (OTC)-traded HEP financial instruments due to their lack of 
sufficient liquidity. Among the reasons for these shallow markets are the (1) 
lack of readily available homes that can be inventoried and sold at a 
moment’s notice, (2) relatively unknown relationships between residential 
real estate returns and those on other portfolio assets, (3) relatively high real 
estate price volatility, (4) paucity of hedging alternatives, and (5) inability to 
derive meaningful option prices due to the problematic relationship between 
most option pricing models and the real estate market. These markets violate 
important assumptions that lie behind popular contingent option pricing 
models, such as the Black-Scholes-Merton formula. For example, real estate: 
(1) prices do not move randomly – especially in the short term,11 (2) 
transactions are not costless, (3) markets are not liquid, and (4) cash market 
prices and derivative market prices are difficult or impossible to arbitrage.12 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
10 If enough people participated, exchange markets in HEP contracts could help 
predict future real estate prices. 
11 Residential home prices display a significant degree of autocorrelation (i.e., 
inertia), which improves short-term forecasts but reduces the accuracy of option 
pricing models. See Robert J. Shiller, Derivatives Markets for Home Prices 4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w13962, April 2008). 
12 Nevertheless, pricing models have been developed, which try to overcome 
these obstacles. See Robert A. Jarrow, A Simple Robust Model for Cat Bond 
Valuation, 7 FIN. RES. LETTERS 72 (2010); ALEXANDER MELNIKOV, RISK ANALYSIS 
IN FINANCE AND INSURANCE (Chapman & Hall 2004); James A. Boness, Elements 
of a Theory of Option Value, 72 J. POL. ECON. 163 (1974); Paul A. Samuelson, 
Rational Theory of Warrant Pricing, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 13 (1965); George 
Constantinides, Market Risk Adjustment in Project Evaluation, 33 J. OF FIN. 603 
(1978); Robert J. Shiller, supra, note 11; 3 JONATHAN E. INGERSOLL, J. E., THEORY 
OF FIN. DECISION MAKING (Rowman & Littlefield 1987). 
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E. REGULATION AND PERCEIVED RISKS 
 
The existence of high regulatory costs and perceived risks also 
explains the slow growth of HEP insurance contracts. Regulatory costs deter 
start-up companies from entering markets and, for those that already offer 
these contracts, compliance costs can substantially reduce profits. On the 
positive side, regulations may increase consumer confidence, thereby 
encouraging HEP companies to offer supervised contracts. State laws and 
insurance commission rules regulate companies that offer FGI contracts. As 
a result, an FGI company must be licensed and comply with the rules and 
regulations of each state in which it operates.  
Expensive regulations could cause the failure of HEP insurance 
companies, which means a company that offers FGI contracts and fails might 
have survived and thrived, in the same state, if it had been permitted to offer 
unregulated NIFP contracts. Due to the relatively small historical sample size 
and multitude of possible causes of HEP company failures, econometrically 
pinning success or failure on differences in regulation is challenging.  
Colorado-based Home Value Insurance Company (HVIC) and 
Ohio-based EquityLock Solutions, LLC (ELS) help frame the FGI-versus-
NIFP issue. Both companies began operations in 2011, offered similar HEP 
contracts, and neither of them had legacy policies from the pre-Great 
Recession years. One major difference was HVIC was regulated as an FGI 
company and ELS escaped state regulation because it was deemed to offer 
NIFP. Despite seemingly favorable market conditions, HVIC suspended 
policy sales in August 2012 and received court-approved dissolution the 
following December. By contrast, ELS was still a going concern, as of 
January 2016. Differences in regulations may or may not have been a major 
cause of ELS’s survival and HVIC’s demise, but over-regulation carries 
associated costs, and under-regulation carries potential risks to consumers. 
Therefore, determining the basis on which HEP companies should be 
regulated has important implications. 
 
IV. THREE REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES FOR HEP 
CONTRACTS 
 
HEP contracts are hybrids, having both insurance-like and financial-
product-like features, which explains inconsistencies between states in 
determining the regulatory status of HEP companies and why states vary 
their positions over time. Currently, U.S. companies wishing to sell HEP 
contracts face the three major regulatory alternatives. First, if a state decides 
that the contract is permissible FGI, then the company is regulated as an 
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insurance company. If the contract is deemed impermissible FGI (i.e., not on 
the list of state-approved FGI contracts), then the company is prohibited from 
selling this product in that state, and attempts to do so would be met with 
cease-and-desist orders. Finally, if a state decides that the contract is NIFP, 
then it escapes state insurance regulations and may also escape federal 
regulations. The dilemma with classifying an HEP contract as impermissible 
FGI is that it inhibits the development of a market with potentially high value 
to the average resident homeowner. By contrast, the problem with classifying 
it as an NIFP product is companies offering contracts on OTC markets may 
avoid all regulation, thereby, leaving state residents unprotected from illicit 
companies and policies.  
The experience of New York State’s Department of Financial 
Services (NY DFS) provides an example of the difficulties that regulators 
may encounter when they try to classify HEP contracts. In 2002, NY DFS 
ruled that a proposed HEP contract “does not constitute insurance and 
contracts entered into with homebuyers pursuant to the Program will not be 
viewed as insurance contracts.”13 About four-and-a-half years later, in 2008, 
NY DFS changed its opinion and ruled that these contracts are impermissible 
FGI.14 Subsequently, this new ruling was reinforced by opinions published 
on 200815 and 2011.16 
The locus of regulatory authority for NIFP contracts depends on 
whether they are exchange-traded or OTC-traded products and whether they 
are securities or derivatives. Companies that offer exchange-traded securities 
or options on securities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Those offering exchange-traded derivatives are 
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and 
finally, companies that offer OTC financial contracts escape federal 
regulations. Rather, the rights of NIFP buyers and sellers are protected 
mainly by commercial law through the courts. In cases where there are 
disagreements as to the locus of regulatory authority, the courts decide, and 
                                                                                                                 
13 See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., Re: Home Equity Protection Program, 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2002/rg205012.htm (accessed Jan. 1, 2016). 
14 See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., Re: Home Equity Protection Plan Proposal 
(2008), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2008/rg080111.htm (accessed Jan. 1, 
2016).   
15  Id. 
16 Id. This decision focused on a HEP contract offered by a non-profit 
organization. The ruling confirmed that the contract was, indeed, insurance.  
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they have relatively wide discretion in determining what is and is not an 
insurance product.  
FGI companies must meet all state licensure requirements and obey 
the statutes and rules that are passed by state legislatures and, subsequently, 
promulgated and enforced by state insurance departments/commissions.17 
Among the most important requirements are minimum capital and 
contingency reserve levels, aggregate and single counterparty risk 
limitations, and exposure-to-equity ratios. Even though HEP companies that 
offer OTC products may escape almost all regulations, their policyholders 
have enforceable rights under state and federal contract laws, making courts 
and the nation’s judicial system (rather than insurance commissions) the 
major checks and balances on these NIFP-types of HEP contracts. 
 
V. MATERIAL INTEREST18: RISK TRANSFER VERSUS RISK 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
HEP contracts can be used to transfer or transform fortuitous risks. 
Transferring home price risk means buying protection against home price 
reductions. Transforming it means buying and/or selling this price protection 
to increase, decrease, eliminate, or otherwise alter the risk-return tradeoffs 
of residential real estate exposures. Transferring risks implies possession of 
an underlying material interest, but material interest has an important added 
function, which is to prevent Individual A from purchasing an insurance 
policy on Individual B’s home, which would allow Individual A to benefit 
from Individual B’s misfortune and, possibly, incentivize Individual A to 
cause the misfortune. 
FGI products are designed to transfer home price risks from 
customers to insurance companies, which concentrate the risks of dispersed 
                                                                                                                 
17 Most state regulations focus on insurance sellers, but policy buyers also 
have responsibilities, such as disclosing all risks that are known at the time a 
contract is initiated. Publically traded companies that issue financial instruments do 
not face this requirement. 
18 The origins of material interest can be traced to the 18th and 19th centuries, 
when Anglo-Saxon nations created legislative restrictions on gambling. For years 
prior to that, contracts did not require material interests or indemnification to qualify 
as “insurance.” See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 237 (1996), https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/thbaker/Tom-Baker-On-the-
Genealogy-of-Moral-Hazard.pdf; see also Geoffrey W. Clark, Betting on Lives: The 
Culture of Life Insurance in England: 1695 – 1775 (Manchester Univ. Press, 1999). 
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policyholders and then manage them, in aggregate, mainly by means of 
policy diversification (geographic, demographic, and temporal), reserve 
provisions, owners’ equity, reinsurance, derivatives, deductibles, and 
managed pools of invested premiums. Most FGI customers: (1) have 
relatively unsophisticated financial skills, (2) infrequently (if ever) mark 
their insurance contracts to market, (3) rarely make decisions about whether 
to hedge or unhedged their home equity positions, and, (4) generally, want 
to free themselves from frequent investment decisions regarding their homes. 
Paying insurance premiums allows these individuals to protect their equity 
stakes against downside home price risks while simultaneously enjoying the 
benefits of upside price potential.19 In this respect, FGI contracts are like 
financial put options.  
By contrast, NIFP contracts are designed for investors and 
speculators who wish to transform home price risks. In contrast to insurance 
companies, which concentrate risks, NIFP companies widely distribute them 
among financial counterparties. Risk transformers are best viewed in the 
context of optimizing the return on diversified portfolios of assets, which 
means they are not the focus of state insurance commissions.  
 
VI. FGI, INDEMNIFICATION, AND THE USE OF PRICE INDICES 
 
Ideally, an FGI contract should fully indemnify the contract holder 
for fortuitous losses, while simultaneously offering no opportunities to earn 
profits or incur net losses. This goal can only be accomplished if the contract 
ties customer claims to the fair market purchase and sales prices of a home, 
but doing so creates problems that could threaten the financial sustainability 
of any company offering HEP contracts, which would curtail the growth of 
this industry. In short, states that require full indemnification for a HEP 
contract to be considered FGI could be making “the best” an enemy of “the 
good.” 
HEP companies, such as EquityLock Solutions, argue that the use of 
price indices is evidence that its policies are financial (not insurance) 
contracts because homeowners can have material interest in their homes but 
not in real estate price indices. They buttress this argument with the fact that 
full indemnification cannot be guaranteed because it is possible for a 
protected home’s price to change independently from the housing price 
index.  
These arguments are unconvincing on four grounds. First, a 
declining local real estate price index implies relative reductions in the value 
                                                                                                                 
19 Shiller & Weiss, supra note 2. 
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of all properties in that area. Even homes that appreciate in value (e.g., due 
to renovations, refashioning, improvements, enlargement, or historical 
significance) when price indices fall are affected by declining average home 
values because their sales prices would have been higher in rising markets.20 
Second, because they have maximum payouts, even HEP contracts that tie 
claims to transactions prices fail to fully indemnify contract holders, once 
the maximum payout is exceeded (more about this later). Therefore, only 
contracts with no maximum payouts can fully indemnify customers under all 
price-change scenarios. Third, each homeowner has, at least, a partial 
material interest in a local price index. Finally, the use of transaction prices 
encourages collusion, deceit, and asymmetric information problems between 
homebuyers and sellers, which could lead to the failure of companies 
offering these contracts (more about this later). As a result, states that 
automatically classify contracts offering price-index-linked HEP claims as 
NIFP emasculate their abilities to protect residents from ill-conceived and 
illegitimate providers. 
 
A. A CLOSER LOOK AT HEP INDEMNIFICATION 
 
Exhibit 3 shows payoff profiles for an individual who has a long real 
estate position and owns a HEP contract with a 25% cap on claim payments. 
This position is equivalent to owning a hybrid security with a (1) long home 
position, (2) long, at-the-money put option, and (3) short, out-of-the-money 
(by 25%) put option. For a homeowner, the short put is the speculative part 
of this financial hybrid, and it is technically inconsistent with, what is 
normally thought of as, insurance. The short put’s purpose is mainly to 
reduce potential claims facing FGI companies and, also, to reduce the policy 
premium. To minimize the importance of this speculative component, the 
short put’s strike price would be set as low as possible. 
Exhibit 3A assumes the HEP payout is tied to the percentage change 
in a home’s market value (HEP-CHV), and Exhibit 3B assumes the contract 
is tied to a percentage change in the housing price index (HEP-IND).21 The 
HEP-CHV payoff profile, which is shown in Exhibit 3A, is the discontinuous 
line labeled ABCD, and the HEP-IND payoff profile is the discontinuous 
line labeled ABCD, which is shown in Exhibit 3B. Due to the 
                                                                                                                 
20 This reasoning is consistent with NY DFS’ written opinion, which changed 
its position on whether HEP contracts were NIFP or FGI. See N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., 
supra note 14. 
21 To simplify the graphs, these examples assume that the home is 100% 
financed.  
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maximum payout limit (e.g., 25%), neither contract provides complete 
indemnification relative to its underlier price (see segments AB in Exhibit 
3A and AB in Exhibit 3B). At the same time, both contracts allow owners 
to enjoy capital gains when home prices rise (see segments CD in Exhibit 
3A and CD in Exhibit 3B). 
Exhibit 3 
Relationship between HEP-CHV and HEP-IND Contracts 
 
 
An important conclusion to draw from Exhibits 3A and 3B is that 
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indemnification, are actually distinctions about whether the maximum 
payout on a HEP contract is sufficiently large to be called indemnification 
because, once the maximum payout percent is reached, indemnification 
stops. 
 
VII. ADVANTAGES OF USING HOME-PRICE-INDEXED HEP 
CONTRACTS 
 
Linking HEP contracts to home price indices has both social and 
individual advantages, such as: (1) encouraging home maintenance, 
improvements, and repairs, (2) enabling existing homeowners to purchase 
these contracts, (3) permitting individuals to make claims without selling 
their homes, and (4) reducing illicit customer claims. 
 
A. PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS ENCOURAGE HOME 
MAINTENANCE, IMPROVEMENTS, AND REPAIRS 
 
In Exhibit 4, the payoff profiles for the HEP-CHV and HEP-IND 
contracts provide illuminating insights when both of them are evaluated 
relative to changes in a home’s current market price. The HEP-CHV contract 
has the same asymmetric payoff profile (ABCD) shown in Exhibit 3A. 
By contrast, the HEP-IND contract now has a symmetric payoff profile (like 
a long forward contract), which shifts to the left as the price index falls and 
shifts to the right as it rises. Therefore, if the price index falls, the HEP-IND 
payoff profile changes, for example, from ZD to an interior line, such as 
RS (see Exhibit 4). 
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Exhibit 4 
Payoffs When Changes in a Home’s Price and the Price Index Are Not 
Perfectly Correlated 
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If there was a perfect, one-for-one inverse relationship between 
changes in home prices and changes in housing price indices, the payoff 
profile for HEP-IND would be identical to the payoff profile of HEP-CHV, 
namely, ABCD in Exhibit 4. By contrast, if these prices were not 
perfectly correlated, the payoff profile labeled AX would be the left-side 
limit to which the HEP-IND contract could move, and it would be reached 
once the price index fell by 25% or more. The payoff profile labeled ZD 
would be the right-side limit of the HEP-IND contract, which would be 
reached when price index remained the same or rose.  
In the range of prices between B and C, changes in the price index 
vary between 25% (i.e., the maximum payout) and positive infinity. If price 
index falls by a greater percentage than the market value of a home, the 
wealth of the HEP-IND contract owner rises (see the gray area above BC 
in Exhibit 4). Similarly, in the range BC, if a home’s market value falls by 
a greater percentage than the price index, the wealth of a HEP-IND contract 
owner falls (see the gray area below BC in Exhibit 4).  
An important conclusion to draw from Exhibit 4 is HEP-IND 
contracts promote behavior that enhances social welfare because owners are 
over-indemnified only when the market values of their homes fall by less 
than the price index. Therefore, added compensation comes only by beating 
the average, which encourages overall home care and maintenance.  
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B. PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS CAN BE PURCHASED BY 
EXISTING HOME OWNERS 
 
Individuals who already own homes and those purchasing them both 
have material interests, but potential problems can arise when HEP contracts 
are sold to the former group because reliable market values for the protected 
assets may be lacking in the absence of actual home sales. If this problem 
were insurmountable, then HEP contracts might be restricted to only 
individuals who are purchasing homes.  
One way to offer these contracts to existing homeowners is by using 
mutually agreeable, independent appraisers to determine home values;22 
another is to use housing price indices to inflate or deflate property values 
from their original purchase prices to the current index-adjusted values and, 
then, use the differences as the basis for claims. Therefore, the HEP payout 
per home would equal the percentage change in the price index times the 
protected value.  
 
C. PRICE-INDEXED HEP INSURANCE CONTRACTS ALLOW CLAIMS 
AT CONTRACT MATURITY, WITHOUT HOME SALES 
 
HEP insurance contracts could be written to allow claims (1) only 
when a home is sold, (2) at contract maturity, or (3) any time before the 
contract matures. The differences are important. 
 
1. Allowing claims only upon the sale of a home 
 
Restricting HEP insurance claims solely to contract owners who sell 
their homes at a loss has two major advantages. First, it clearly establishes 
the contract as a risk-transfer vehicle that protects against unfortunate, 
fortuitous life events. Second, the requirement significantly reduces the 
liquidity risks facing HEP insurance companies because it moderates claims 
by broadly distributing them over time (i.e., temporal diversification). 
 
2. Paying claims at contract maturity 
 
Allowing individuals to make claims when their contracts mature 
raises questions regarding how a home’s market price can be determined in 
the absence of a free market sale. As previously mentioned, one solution is 
                                                                                                                 
22 Shiller and Weiss, supra note 2, at 25. 
2016 HEP COMPANIES AND CONTRACTS 19 
 
to use independent external appraisers, and another is to tie claims to changes 
in price indices.  
A major advantage of allowing individuals to make claims on HEP 
contracts at maturity, without the need to sell their homes, is it improves the 
long-term hedging effectiveness of these contracts.23 Consider an individual 
who simultaneously purchases a $100,000 home and 10-year HEP contract. 
To finance the transaction, suppose he/she borrows $90,000 and makes a 
$10,000 down payment. At maturity, if the home’s market value falls to 
$95,000 and the price index falls to 95, the homeowner is unlikely to sell 
his/her home and relocate in order to collect just $5,000 in claims. 
Transaction costs are too high. As a result, if the contract is renewed at the 
home’s current market value (i.e., $95,000), the individual’s wealth would 
fall by $5,000. By contrast, if this HEP owner could make a claim without 
selling his/her home at maturity, s/he would receive $5,000 in claims and 
then be able to re-protect the home for $95,000, thereby retaining his/her 
equity at the original level of $10,000. 
Because selling a home and moving to a new location can be costly, 
the sales price must fall considerably to offer attractive opportunities. At a 
minimum, the home price reduction needs to exceed the monetary costs (e.g., 
realtor’s fees, moving expenses, and refurbishments) and the emotional costs 
that come from leaving familiar friends, schools, and social networks. 
Evidence in the market for mortgage insurance indicates that a home’s 
market value needs to fall at least 10% to 25%24 below the outstanding 
                                                                                                                 
23 This practice is common for non-delivery derivative contracts, such as those 
purchased and sold on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).  
24 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints 
to Strategic Default on Mortgages 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 15145, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15145.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 
2016). Neil Bhutta, Jane Dokko, & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and 
Mortgage Default Decisions 43 (FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 
2010-35, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf, (accessed 
Jan. 1, 2016); Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Negative 
Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON. 234 (2008); 
EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN, Understanding Strategic Default in Mortgages Part I 
(Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Report 2009 Topical Report Series, 
2009); EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN, Strategic Defaults in Mortgages: Q2 2011 
Update, Market Intelligence Reports (2011 Topical Report Series, 2011), 
https://www.experian.com/assets/decision-analytics/reports/oliver-wyman-
strategic-default-2011.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2016); EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN, 
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mortgage value to trigger a strategic default, which occurs when individuals, 
who can afford to pay their mortgages, walk away from them because the 
market values of their homes are less than the outstanding mortgage balances 
(i.e., they have negative equity).25 
 
3. Allowing claims any time before contract maturity 
 
Allowing policyholders to make claims any time before contracts 
mature changes a HEP policy from a risk transfer agent to a risk transformer. 
Such flexibility also complicates the efforts of these companies to predict 
future claim liabilities and, thereby, results in higher premiums, which 
reduce the amount of protection purchased.26 Furthermore, permitting such 
flexibility distances these HEP policies from the fortuitous, unfortunate life-
events they are supposed to address.  
 
D. PRICE-INDEXED HEP CONTRACTS CAN REDUCE ILLEGITIMATE 
CUSTOMER CLAIMS 
 
HEP insurance companies can be the victims of asymmetric 
information problems, as well as collusion and deceit.27 Asymmetric 
information occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better 
information than his/her counterpart. Collusion and deceit can occur when 
individuals sell their homes to collaborators at unjustifiably low prices, make 
illicit HEP claims, and then split the ill-gotten gains. 
 
                                                                                                                 
Strategic Defaults in Mortgages: Q2 2010 update (Market Intelligence Reports, 
2010 Topical Report Series, 2010), https://www.experian.com/assets/decision-
analytics/reports/strategic-default-report-2-2010.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2016). 
25 Strategic defaults can also be caused by double-trigger events, such as 
negative equity in combination with pessimistic expectations about housing prices. 
Therefore, even if negative equity is the primary cause of a strategic default, it may 
not be the only cause.  
26 It is virtually impossible for a HEP company to hedge the risk of contract 
cancellations. While the average duration of a contract might be estimated, its 
variance is tied closely to whether home prices rise or fall, thereby leaving these 
companies vulnerable to significant over-estimations or under-estimations of 
revenues.  
27 See Karl E. Case, Robert J. Shiller & Allen N. Weiss, Mortgage Default Risk 
and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate 
(Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1098, 1995), http://cowles.yale.edu/ 
sites/default/files/files/pub/d10/d1098.pdf; Shiller & Weiss, supra note 2.    
2016 HEP COMPANIES AND CONTRACTS 21 
 
1. Asymmetric information 
 
Two major types of asymmetric information are adverse selection, 
which occurs before a contract has been signed, and moral hazard, which 
occurs afterwards. Both cause potential problems for HEP insurance 
companies. 
 
a. Adverse selection 
 
Home sellers are likely to have better information than FGI 
companies about the fair market values of their particular houses and also 
about specific community risks. For instance, individuals who feel they 
overpaid for their homes or live in areas with substantial downside price risks 
(e.g., due to increasing crime rates) are likely to be HEP buyers. Conversely, 
those who feel they paid bargains prices for their homes or live in areas with 
substantial upward price potential are unlikely buyers of these contracts. 
Therefore, asymmetric information introduces selection biases into the pool 
of potential HEP insurance customers, weighting the population toward 
those most in need, which increases claim risk and renders statistical 
analyses problematic – especially when predictive validity and reliability 
depend on customer pools having normal distributions. These added risks 
increase customer premiums, which reduce the amount of protection 
purchased. 
 
b. Moral hazard 
 
Moral hazard occurs when individuals behave differently after they 
are insured because they no longer bear the full consequences of their actions 
and also when they can influence both the odds and size of their potential 
claims. On the demand side, HEP contracts encourage individuals to pay 
above-market prices for their homes, knowing that their downside market 
risks are hedged. In fact, losses on properties that have been owned for long 
periods of time have been traced to their owners paying too much for them.28  
On the supply side, HEP contracts reduce sellers’ incentives to negotiate the 
best prices in down markets because they know that losses, up to the 
maximum limits, will be covered by insurance. HEP contracts also 
                                                                                                                 
28 Between 1990 and 2006, about 50% to 60% of the homes sold in the 
Melbourne, Australia area were estimated to have incurred losses due to initial 
overpayments. See Dag Einar Sommervoll & Gavin Wood, Home Equity Insurance, 
3 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 66, 75 (2011). 
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discourage homeowners from preforming routine maintenance on protected 
properties, and they encourage fanciful decorating, which could reduce a 
home’s sales price. One way companies could try to protect themselves from 
this moral hazard problem is by requiring evidence of minimum 
maintenance, but such arrangements are difficult to enforce because 
objective verification of needed repairs may not be possible and the timing 
of such work is open to discretion.29 Another alternative is for HEP insurance 
companies to retain the right of first refusal, which would allow them to 
purchase and then resell homes whose sales prices seem unjustifiably low. 
 
c. Using a price index to solve collusion, deceit, 
and asymmetric information problems 
 
The major benefit of using transaction prices to determine HEP 
claims is the clear line of sight they provide between changes in the equity 
an owner has at risk and changes in the value of the protection contract. The 
major disadvantage is these contracts encourage collusion, deceit, and 
asymmetric information problems. One solution to this problem is to base 
claims on home price indices because companies that supply these contracts 
do not need to appraise or monitor the protected homes. Price indices can 
reduce these problems by disconnecting HEP claims from property sales 
prices. Therefore, regardless of how far below the market price a home is 
sold, claims can be made only if the housing price index (over which the 
individual has no power) falls from beginning to end. 
Consider the problems of collusion and deceit. Suppose a home with 
an initial market value of $100,000 is purchased simultaneously with a HEP 
contract having a maximum payout of 25%. Suppose further that, when the 
home is sold (after the vesting period), its market value remains the same, 
but the owner tries to deceive the HEP company by selling the house to an 
accomplice for a below-market price equal to $85,000. Exhibit 5 assumes 
that all the proceeds from this collusive act ($15,000) revert, in the form of 
a kickback, to the original homeowner. It compares the results if claims are 
based on the property’s transaction prices versus a home price index, which 
rises by 10%, stays the same, or falls by 10%, 15%, and 40%.  
                                                                                                                 
29 Shiller and Weiss, supra note 2, at 25,27. 
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Exhibit 5 
Payoffs to Collusion and Deceit: Transaction-Price versus Price-Indexed 
Contracts* 
Contract Initiation  
   Purchase price $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
   Price Index 100 100 100 100 100 
Contract Termination   
% Home Price Index +10% 0% 10% 15% 40% 
Return to the collusive seller when transaction prices are used  
   Purchase price $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
   Unfair sales price $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 
   Claim 
      Purchase price  sales 
price 
$15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 
   Kickback $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 
   Net gain for the seller +$15,000 +$15,000 +$15,000 +$15,000 +$15,000 
Return to the collusive seller when a price index is used 
   Purchase price $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
   Unfair sales price $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 
   HEP Claim 0 0 $10,000 $15,000 $25,000** 
       If %PI < 0, then claims = % price index × protected value; otherwise, claims = 0. 
   Kickback $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 
   Net gain for the seller $0 $0 $10,000 $15,000 +$25,000 
* Assets and claims are positive values. Liabilities are negative values. This example ignores mortgage 
amortization. 
** The maximum payout is 25%. Therefore, the price index can fall no lower than 75 when prices decline by 
25% or more. 
 
Notice that the transaction-price alternative locks in a $15,000 gain, 
but the price-index-alternative gains nothing if the price index rises or stays 
the same. It progressively earns positive returns as the price index falls, 
reaching a maximum gain of $25,000 when the percentage change in the 
price index reaches the payoff limit of 25%. Exhibit 5 shows that it is 
possible for the seller to gain more under the price-index alternative than the 
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transaction-price alternative only if the price index declines by a greater 
percent than the home’s market price. 
HEP companies could eliminate this profit loophole by basing 
claims on the higher of a home’s market price or housing price index. Exhibit 
6 shows the results from this hybrid method. Notice how losses to the 
colluding seller are the same as Exhibit 5 until the price index falls by a 
greater percent than the sales price, at which point the hybrid method reduces 
the sellers’ gains from what would have occurred using the price-index 
method.  
Exhibit 6 
Payoffs to Collusion and Deceit if Claims are Based the Higher of the 
Sales Price or Price-Indexed Price* 
Contract Initiation 
   Purchase price of home $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
Contract Termination 
% Home Price Index +10% 0% 10% 15% 40% 
   Price index-value $110,000 $100,000 $90,000 $85,000 $75,000** 
   Unfair sales price $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 $85,000 
   HEP Claim $0 $0 $10,000 $15,000 $15,000 
      Claims = higher of (1) (sales price  purchase price) or (2) if %PI < 0, (% price index × 
protected value), otherwise, claims = 0 
   Kickback $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 
Net gain to collusive seller $0 $0 $10,000 $15,000 $15,000 
* Assets and claims are positive values. Liabilities are negative values. This example ignores 
mortgage amortization. 
** Maximum payout is 25% 
 
Customer perceptions about the fairness of the hybrid method might 
be improved if the HEP contract required the insurer and customer to share 
the burden when a home’s sales price fell by a greater percent than the price 
index. Employing deductibles into these contracts would also reduce or 
eliminate collusion, deceit, and moral hazard problems because it would 
force homeowners to have skin-in-the-game, thereby preventing them from 
extracting the full benefits of their unethical acts.  
 
 
2016 HEP COMPANIES AND CONTRACTS 25 
 
VIII. DISADVANTAGES OF USING HOME-PRICE-INDEXED HEP 
CONTRACTS 
 
Using home price indices is one of the keys to successfully offering 
and developing HEP contracts and markets. For this reason, serious attention 
has been paid to improving price index methodology30 and narrowing index 
coverage to increasingly tapered geographic areas, but until these indices can 
pinpoint each particular home, the chances for full (100%) indemnification 
will remain small.  
The indemnification problem is not unique to the housing market 
and relates to basis risk, which exists when changes in the value of a 
protected asset or liability are not equal and opposite to changes the value of 
the protection contract. As basis risk rises, the likelihood that a hedge will 
fully indemnify the contract owner falls. For example, a U.S. company with 
a €20 million accounts receivable maturing in November might use a 
September or December futures contract to hedge because November futures 
contracts do not exist. Similarly, oil producers may try to hedge the value of 
their committed sales with futures contracts offered on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, where the Brent oil benchmark is used, even though 
the blend of oils in this benchmark does not fully match the producers’ 
specific oil output. 
Basis risk can cause homeowners to be either under-compensated or 
over-compensated whenever the housing price indices used do not have one-
to-one, inverse relationships with the protected homes’ sales prices. Under 
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards (FAS), a transaction qualifies as a 
hedge if it is identified, as such, at inception and achieves its goal within a 
predefined range.31 FAS rules do not differentiate hedge transaction from 
                                                                                                                 
30 See Shiller, Derivative Markets for Home Prices 4, 9-10 (Yale Univ. Econ. 
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 46; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1648, 
2008); Karl E. Case, Robert J. Shiller, & Allan N. Weiss, Mortgage Default Risk 
and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and Options in Real Estate 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5078, 1995). 
31 Under U.S. Financial Accounting Standard 133, a hedge must be declared 
when it is purchased (i.e., at inception), and the correlation coefficient between the 
asset and hedge must range between -0.80 and +1.25, which means any gains above 
25% or losses below 20% are treated, for financial statement purposes, as non-hedge 
transactions. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, Financial Standards No. 133: 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220124631
&acceptedDisclaimer=true (accessed Jan. 1, 2016). 
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investment and speculation transactions based on not whether they guarantee 
100% indemnification. In terms of payoff profiles, hedge contracts are 
identical to insurance contracts. 
If FAS logic were applied to HEP contracts, a company would be 
classified as offering FGI if: (1) each buyer’s intention, at inception and until 
maturity, was to hedge the value of his/her home equity position, and (2) 
indemnification was permitted to vary within reasonable, predetermined 
limits. Ensuring that HEP customers are hedging (i.e., transferring risks) and 
not speculating (i.e., transforming risks) can be accomplished by requiring 
material interest from contract initiation to termination or maturity.  
Whether the HEP contract is effective can be evaluated by its payout 
efficiency, which is the: (1) portion of paid claims that go to individuals who 
incur losses on the sale of their homes32 and/or (2) the extent to which 
homeowners who incur losses are compensated. Therefore, a 0.0 measure 
implies that individuals who incurred losses on their home sales were not 
compensated at all by HEP policies, and a 1.0 measure implies full 
indemnification. 
A study in Melbourne, Australia,33 using metropolitan and 
neighborhood housing price indices to determine HEP payout efficiency, 
found that between half and slightly less than two-thirds of the people who 
experienced home equity losses would have been compensated by these 
contracts.34 Payout efficiency improved when contract maturity was 
lengthened.  
To implement price-indexed FGI contracts, U.S. states could 
establish allowable limits for payout efficiency, perhaps beginning with U.S. 
FAS standards and then adjusting them with experience. New FGI 
companies might be required by state insurance commissions to show 
evidence that threshold payout efficiencies could be reached before they sell 
their contracts. Such requirements would promote the creation of better 
home price indices and also encourage the development of private market 
solutions that protect home equity. Because the level of basis risk depends 
heavily on the index chosen, results could be back-checked, periodically, to 
                                                                                                                 
32 Remember that, in a declining market, HEP contracts would also pay claims 
to individuals whose homes rose in price or remained constant. 
33 Australia’s housing market is similar to the United States in that 
approximately 70% of families own homes and home equity constitutes about 40% 
of the average family’s wealth. 
34 Sommervoll & Wood, supra note 28. This study did not allow for moral 
hazard and adverse selection, which could significantly affect the study’s 
conclusions.  
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make sure the best-in-class housing price indices were being used. Earnings 
or losses that fell outside the predetermined bounds could be taxed as 
ordinary income.  
 
A. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND PRICE-INDEXED HEP 
CONTRACTS 
 
The attributes of HEP contracts are endogenous, in the sense that 
companies can configure them to gain or circumvent state regulation. 
Problems arise when these attributes meet the letter of the law but not its 
intent. One way these companies can engage in regulatory arbitrage is by 
establishing themselves as NIFP companies in states that permit it and then 
transforming their financial liabilities into insurance liabilities via special 
purpose vehicles (i.e., transformer companies). Companies may gain NIFP 
status by linking their contracts to home price indices, which do not 
guarantee full indemnification and, therefore, do not meet the pure definition 
of insurance. Once established as NIFP companies, they try to conduct 
business in other states, either by offering NIFP contracts directly or by using 
surplus lines brokers.  
 
B. TRANSFORMER COMPANIES 
 
Transformer companies can convert financial risks into insurance 
risks or vice versa. They may be independent from the HEP firms with which 
they deal or created and capitalized by the HEP companies, themselves. 
Therefore, a company can (1) sell its contracts as financial products in one 
state, (2) create an FGI company in a different state, country, or offshore 
center that has lower standards, and (3) then use this FGI company as 
evidence to potential and existing customers that its contracts are safe. 
Problems can arise when this type of regulatory arbitrage creates only the 
illusion of safety. The likelihood of this happening is relatively high when 
the standards regulating the relationships between in-state NIFP companies 
and out-of-state FGI companies, which are business-to-business (B2B) 
transactions, are weaker than the standards regulating in-state business-to-
customer (B2C) transactions.  
Resident victimization could result if the buyers of these FGI 
contracts are unlikely to understand or take the time to discover that an out-
of-state FGI company is owned or controlled by the in-state NIFP firm and, 
therefore, offers little additional protection. Similarly, problems could arise 
when the out-of-state FGI company’s policies, procedures, and financial 
structure would not pass in-state insurance standards. One way states can 
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defend residents against potential abuses of transformer companies is to 
allow them only for licensed insurers in state-authorized locations. 
 
C. SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE AND BROKERS 
 
Surplus lines insurance permits a state’s residents to purchase 
insurance from out-of-state property and casualty insurance companies via 
licensed in-state surplus lines brokers. The out-of-state insurers bear the real 
estate price risks and collect premiums for these services. Surplus lines 
brokers are used when a type of property or casualty insurance is not offered 
by any insurance company in a particular state. Therefore, an insurance 
company in State A can sell its policies in States B, C, and D by offering a 
unique insurance product and then finding surplus lines brokers in other 
states that are willing and able to sell it. The use of surplus lines brokers 
eliminates the time, effort, and expense of gaining licenses in these other 
states.35 If surplus lines brokers are used for purposes of regulatory arbitrage, 
states can try to control this practice by restricting transactions to licensed 
FGI companies that are located in pre-approved states, countries, and 
offshore centers.  
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
HEP contracts can transfer home price risks from those who are least 
able to evaluate them to those who are best able. These contracts can more 
fully develop capital markets by providing a low-cost and efficient means of 
shorting the housing market, thereby making real estate prices more efficient 
and reducing the likelihood of speculative distortions, such as price bubbles. 
Less distorted prices, lower transactions costs, and greater liquidity act to 
encourage capital flows toward real estate markets, thereby increasing 
aggregate investments. Even in cases where the correlation between the 
homes being insured and the real estate price index used for hedging is not 
exact, HEP products can bring substantial value to many homeowners who 
are seeking ways to protect the home equity they have accumulated.  
Linking FGI contracts to home price indices is a practical and 
effective way to develop the HEP market while protecting both HEP 
insurance customers and companies. Price indexed FGI contracts: (1) 
encourage home maintenance, improvements, and repairs, (2) more fully 
open the HEP market to existing homeowners, (3) offer protection to 
                                                                                                                 
35 If a state insurance regulator determines that the contract offered in 
impermissible FGI, then it cannot be sold in that state via surplus lines brokers. 
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individuals who do not wish to sell their homes, and (4) help defend FGI 
contract suppliers from customer collusion, deceit, and asymmetric 
information problems. At the same time, states can retain more rights than 
they relinquish, which enables them to protect resident homeowners, who 
are the likely victims of illicit HEP companies and contracts. 
For all the years that HEP insurance contacts have been offered, 
states have wrestled with regulating them appropriately, taxing them fairly, 
and allowing these markets to function effectively. Solving regulatory issues 
related to HEP contracts is not a singular cause because these debates will 
continue to surface, as they have in the past, when financial instruments (e.g., 
weather derivatives, credit default swaps, and catastrophe options) were 
invented and offered for sale. 
  
